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We examine the bidding competition for a set of complementary assets arising between two
firms who also compete in a differentiated product market. The bidding contest takes the form of
an acquisition battle for a third firm initially holding the assets. Depending on the nature of
product competition between the bidding firms, either both bidding firms are made worse off by
the availability of these assets or, paradoxically, the firm winning the bidding contest is less
profitable than is the firm losing it.  Our analysis is relevant to the many recent mergers in
telecommunications, finance, and transportation, e.g., Viacom’s purchase of CBS.
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I.  Introduction
In a recent acquisition battle, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. beat Viacom to buy the extensive
TV-station network of Chris-Craft, Inc.  Many analysts viewed this merger as a way for News Corp.
to acquire a distribution network for its productions in order to improve its competitive position in
the entertainment production market.
1 This view suggests that the merger is essentially a vertical one
in that it is a merger between two firms whose assets are complementary. The acquisition of CBS by
Viacom and Disney’s purchase of ABC are, in this sense, similar to the News Corp. and Chris-Craft
merger.  However, in other vertical mergers the complementarity lies between the two firms’ non-
competing but related product lines.  A long-distance phone company such as AT&T may purchase
a local phone system (TCI) or a cable system (MediaOne).  Similarly, a firm specializing primarily
in insurance and brokerage operations (Traveler’s) may acquire a firm specialized in consumer
banking  (Citicorp), or a regional railroad firm (Union Pacific) extending its geographic reach by
acquiring a second rail carrier in an adjacent area (Southern Pacific).
Mergers of complementary assets have been a substantial component of the current and now, quite
long-lived merger wave.  As the examples above illustrate, many of the mergers in the entertainment,
telecommunications, finance and fashion industries have been precisely such a union of complements
rather than a union of direct competitors.
2 Moreover, as the takeover battles over Chris-Craft, or CBS and
MediaOne make clear, the acquiring firm is typically not the only firm interested in merging with the
target firm and obtaining its assets.  Indeed, the firms interested in bidding for the target are more often
than not firms that do directly compete in some product market.  They extend this competition in the
pursuit of the complementary asset precisely because they believe ownership of the asset will enhance
their success in that product market.
One curious anomaly about mergers in general is that while the bids for the target firms are generous
and typically include a large premium above the initial share price of these firms, the return to the2
acquiring firms is, in fact, quite modest. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983), summarize the
purchase premia found in thirteen separate studies as providing an average two-month return to target
firm stockholders of 29.1 percent.  Yet both their work and that of Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988)
can be summarized as indicating that, in the window of time around the merger, the acquiring firm’s
stockholders are only marginally better off.  Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find an abnormal return
to target firm shareowners of 25.6 percent while the buying firm’s excess return over a five-year horizon
averaged -6.5%.  To be sure, the return to the acquiring firm is not always easy to measure because it
requires the use of an event window methodology and it is not always clear just when the window was
opened. Often the official announcement of the acquisition is preceded by a release of substantial
information, the filing of 13D's, and other public actions. Still, the clear finding of the empirical literature
is that the benefits of most acquisitions to the acquiring firms have been modest at best.
In this paper we examine the competition for complementary assets between firms who also compete
in a differentiated product market. A key assumption in our approach is that firms differentiate their
products through the use of differentiated inputs and that the complementary asset that a firm seeks to
acquire can serve this differentiation role, whether it is a unique location, brand name, or distribution
chain.  Typically, such assets are initially held by a business entity that we refer to as the target firm.
Therefore, the competition for such assets is played out in the market for corporate acquisitions.
Our analysis is set in the framework of a duopoly model.  There are two firms who produce and
market differentiated products and compete in price for customers.  The firms also compete to buy a
target firm or complementary asset, e.g., CBS.  We assume that the complementary asset has a public
good character in so far as how its acquisition affects consumer demand for the differentiated product.
That is, in the eyes of consumers, News Corp.’s purchase of Chris-Craft, or Disney’s purchase of ABC
will affect the quality, respectively, of every News Corp. or Disney production.
In order for there to be a bidding competition for the complementary asset, or for the target firm, the
asset must be relatively scarce.  In the context of a duopoly model, such scarcity implies that there is only3
one complementary asset to be bought.  Accordingly, we examine the merger bidding strategy of two
competitors in a product-differentiated market; each interested in purchasing the unique complementary
asset as a means of competing more effectively in the product market.  We then examine the implications
of the bidding game for the outcome in the product market where the two bidders compete.  Chen (2000)
also considers a strategic bidding game between two firms, but in a very different context.  There, a firm
with a monopoly in one market competes with a new entrant for the license to produce a new related
product.  Unlike the bidders in Chen’s model, the two firms bidding for the asset in our model both
compete in the same markets.
One central finding of our analysis is that the low returns observed for the shareholders of the
acquiring company reflects something quite different from—and more interesting than—the mere
competing away of any rents.  We find that the bidding game not only results in substantial premia paid
to the acquired firm, but it often leads to a product market outcome such that both bidders are less
profitable than firms in other industries for which no such complementary asset existed.  Moreover, in
some cases, a kind of “winner’s curse” can emerge in which the so-called winning bidder or the firm that
acquires the asset is worse off than the loser is.
The Model
There are two rival firms competing in a product-differentiated market. A firm i sells a differentiated
product whose demand, denoted by qi, depends upon its own price pi, as well as that of the rival firm’s
product pj.  The demand for product i is also affected by the employment of a unique complementary
asset, denoted by Ai, and whether or not the rival has such a complement Aj.  The variables Ai and Aj are
normalized to take on the value 1 if the firm has the desired complementary asset or 0 if it does not.
Further, since there is only one such complementary asset available, if Ai is 1,then Aj must be 0.
The above features of competition for customers in the product market are captured by assuming a
simple demand for good i given by:
qi  = 1 - pi + β pj + Ai - α Aj ;     i = 1,2;   j ≠  i;
                         0 < α  < 1, 0 < β  < 1, Ai = 1, 0
(1)4
The parameter β  measures the positive effect on firm i’s demand due to an increase in the price of the
rival firm’s product.  The parameter α  measures the adverse effect on the firm’s demand when its rival
has the complementary asset.
The complementary asset may be purchased in the financial markets at current price C.  This price
may reflect the asset’s replacement cost or simply the reservation selling price of the asset’s current
owners.  Presumably, the latter value would be reflected in the stock market value of the target firm prior
to the emergence of its value as a complement to either of the bidding firms.  Once a firm purchases the
asset, it’s use in production raises consumer willingness to pay for the firm’s product.  There is also a
constant marginal cost of production, which is assumed to be the same for each firm and, for simplicity,
set equal to zero.
The complementary asset is either bought by the firm making the highest bid, provided that the bid
exceeds C, or it is not acquired at all.  The bid could be an offer of a simple lump sum paid to the current
asset owners.  However, the owners and also the firms bidding to buy the asset from the owners
understand the nature of competition in the product market, and therefore know the additional profit
earned by the firm that acquires the asset.  As a result, any lump sum payment to the asset owners may
also be expressed as a contract offering those owners a fraction s of the acquiring firm’s profit π  such
that sπ  yields the equivalent dollar lump sum.  This second approach facilitates solution of the bidding
game and also seems close to the common reality in which owners of the target firm are often given
shares of stock in the newly merged entity.
3 Denote then by s the reservation profit share.  That is, s is the
profit share such that the payment for the asset sπ  = C.
The game has two-stages.  In the first stage, each firm i makes a bid for the complementary asset si,
expressed as a share of its profit.  The firm that makes the highest bid, provided that the bid is greater
than s, acquires the asset.  In the case of a tie, we assume that firm 1 gets the asset and firm 2 does not.  If
both firms’ bids, s1 and s2, are less than s then neither firm purchases the asset.  After the bidding is done5
and the ownership of the complementary assets is determined, production takes place and, in stage two,
the two rival firms compete in prices, p1, p2, for consumers in the differentiated product market.
We are interested in strategies consisting of bids (s1,s2) for the complementary asset A and prices
 (p1, p2) in the differentiated products market that yield a perfect equilibrium outcome to the game.  In the
usual fashion, we work backwards from the final stage of the game.
 Stage 2:
In stage 2 of the game the ownership of the complementary asset and hence, A1, A2, has been
determined in the previous stage.  The second side of the two-side competition—the price competition
for consumers—now takes place.  In this second stage, as noted above, the each firm’s unit cost of
production is the same and is constant, and for simplicity is set equal to zero.
Given demand for the differentiated product i, qi (pi, pj, Ai, Aj), i = 1,2, j ≠  i, described in (1), firm i
chooses price pi in stage 2 to maximize profit π i(pi, pj; Ai, Aj).  The best response function for firm i in
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The best response functions shown in equation (2) in turn imply that a Nash equilibrium in stage 2 of the
game is a set of prices (p1
*, p2
*) such that:
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Corresponding to these prices are equilibrium (gross) profits:
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The term (2α -β ), in both equations (3) and (4), describes how the equilibrium price set by one firm is
affected by its rival’s ownership of the complementary asset.  When  (2α -β ) > 0, one firm’s acquisition
of the asset results in the other firm having a lower equilibrium price.  In this case, price competition
between the two firms is intensified when one firm acquires the complementary asset and the other does
not.  Ownership of that asset by one firm shifts the price response curves of both firms inward so that
price competition is more aggressive in the final stage of the game.  In the spirit of Bulow, Geanakopolus
and Klemperer (1985), the complementary asset is like a strategic substitute, and acquisition of it by the
rival intensifies competition.
4
On the other hand, when (2α -β ) < 0, then ownership of the complementary asset by one firm
results in a higher equilibrium price for the other firm.  Both firms’ response functions shift in such a
way that stage 2 is characterized by softer price competition.  In this case, the complementary asset is like
a strategic complement and its acquisition softens competition between the two firms.
Stage 1:
In the first stage of the game the two bidding firms compete for ownership of the complementary
target firm.  Because there is only one target firm or one complementary asset, there are only three
possible patterns of ownership involving the two bidding firms.  Either A1  = 1 and A2 = 0, or A1  = 0 and
A2 = 1, or A1 = A2 = 0.  In what follows, we denote the gross profit of the firm that wins the bidding and
acquires the complementary asset by π
W and the gross profit of the firm without that asset by π
L.  Because
the second stage of the game is characterized by either tough or soft price competition depending on
whether or not (2α  – β ) > 0, we examine the first stage bidding game separately for each case.
Case A:  (2αααα  - ββββ ) > 0, The Complementary Asset Toughens Price Competition
From equation (4), we find that when one firm successfully acquires the complementary asset then
the gross profits of the two rival firms π
W and π
L are:




































For the outcome when neither firm acquires the complementary asset, the gross profit earned by each
firm is denoted by π
0, where π
















O                           (6)
Of course, the complementary asset will only remain unpurchased if the both bids made by the two
rival firms—s1 and s2—are less than s, i.e., if the lump sum value of the bid is less than C.  The profit π
O
earned for the case in which the target firm is not acquired by either firm serves a useful benchmark for




Recall that the profit π
W earned by the firm that acquires the complementary asset is not the firm’s
net profit.  Because the acquiring firm must share its profit with the owners of the target firm, its net
profit is (1-s)π
W for any given value of s ≥  s.  For the rival bidding firm, or the one that does not acquire
the complementary asset, the gross profit and the net profit are, however, the same because no contracts
have been executed requiring this firm to share its profit.
To work out a pair of best responses (s1*, s2*) for stage 2 of the game it is useful to define two
critical shares of the gross profit earned by the firm acquiring the complementary asset π
W.  These are
denoted by s
O and s










The profit share s
O is defined as that share such that the net profit earned by the firm purchasing the
unique asset is exactly equal to the profit that same firm would have earned in the case that neither rival
firm acquired the asset.  Similarly, the other important benchmark profit share s
L is defined as a share
such that the net profit of the firm purchasing the complementary asset is exactly equal to the profit of its




L, it also follows that the profit share s
L > s
O.  For this case of (2α  - β ) > 0, the following
propositions hold.
Proposition A1: When the reservation selling price of the asset C is such that the reservation share s
satisfies 0 ≤  s ≤  s
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L, firm 1 buys the asset and earns a net profit, π
W (1-s
L), which is equal
to π
L, the net profit earned by firm 2.  Firm 2 does not have a profit incentive to deviate from its bid
of s2 = s
L.  Offering a lower s2 will leave firm 2 in the same outcome of not obtaining the
complementary asset hiring and earning profit π
L.  A bid of s2 > s
L will result in firm 2 winning the
bidding war and acquiring the target firm but at the cost of driving its net profit below π
L.  Clearly,
neither deviation improves firm 2’s net profits.
Likewise, firm 1 also has no profitable deviation.  A higher bid of s1 > s
L gives away profit, and a
lower bid of s1 < s
L loses the bidding war in which case firm 1 does not obtain the target firm.  Firm 1’s
net profit is then π










L is also a unique Nash equilibrium outcome when 0 ≤   s  ≤  s
O, consider
first any pair of bids (s1, s2) where s  ≤  s1 <  s2 < s
L.  Clearly this cannot be an equilibrium outcome
because in this case firm 1 has an incentive to raise its bid above that of firm 2 and thereby buy the
complementary asset and increase its ultimate net profit.  The same reasoning holds for firm 2 for any
pair of bids (s1, s2), where s ≤  s2 ≤  s1 < s
O.   For bids (s1, s2) where s1 < s2 ≤  s, firm 1 has an incentive to
increase its bid to s and buy the asset.  The firm would then earn net profit π
W (1-s) > π
O since
s ≤  s
O.  Finally, for bids (s1, s2), where s2 ≤  s1 ≤  s, there is similarly an incentive for firm 2 to deviate and
bid s and increase its profit. QED.
Proposition A2: When the reservation selling price of the asset C is such that s satisfies s
O < s ≤  s
L,







which case firm 1 acquires the complementary asset and firm 2 does not.  In addition, there is also a






1 < s and s
*
2 < s, such that
neither firm acquires this asset.






L is an equilibrium is the same as above for




2 are less than s are also Nash
equilibria.  Clearly, in each such case, no firm has an incentive to lower its offer.  No firm has an
incentive to raise its offer either.  Doing so can only affect the market outcome if the offer is raised
to the level of s.  However, the firm that raises its offer this high will see its profit fall from π
0 to
π
W(1-s).  Accordingly, neither firm has an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. QED.
The last case to consider is that in which the value or reservation purchase price s of the target firm
satisfies s  > s
L, or alternatively C > s
Lπ
W.
Proposition A3: When the reservation price of the asset C is such that s satisfies s
L < s then there are




2 )all of which are characterized by a pair of offers satisfying
s
*
1 < s and s
*
2 < s. In all such cases, neither firm acquires the complementary asset, and there is no
bidding war.
Proof:  The proof of this last proposition is self-evident.  Purchasing the complementary asset
requires offering a profit share s greater than s
L.  This will unequivocally lower the profit of the firm
making such a bid.  Hence, neither firm has any incentive to do so.  QED.
The various types of equilibria that arise when one firm’s ownership of the asset toughens price
competition in the product market, i.e., when (2α  - β ) > 0, carry a number of interesting implications.
First, note that in any outcome in which the complementary asset or target firm is purchased, the initial
owners of the target firm earn overall s
Lπ
W > C.  Second, each of the rival bidding firms, the one who
obtains the asset and the one who does not, earn precisely the same net profit.  This, of course, is quite
consistent with the empirical findings.   As noted in the Introduction, the actual data typically find that
target firm shareholders earn a large premium above the above their initial share price, whereas the share10
holders of the acquiring firms are typically shown to have gained little especially when compared to the
returns earned by stockholders in firms not acquiring such assets.  More importantly, the profit earned by
each rival is actually less than π
O, the profit that is earned when no acquisition is made.  In other words,
the successful purchase of the target firm yields a market outcome with a “prisoners’ dilemma” aspect.
Both bidding rival firms earn lower profit than they would have earned if the target firm never existed.
In other words, two factors interact to reduce the net profitability of the firm making the acquisition.  The
first of these is the necessary payment to the initial owners of the complementary asset.  The second is
that purchase of the asset itself intensifies price competition within the product differentiated market.  As
a result, the net profit of the firm acquiring the complementary asset may look especially low when
compared with the net profit of firms in other industries.
Case B:  (2αααα  - ββββ ) < 0, The Complementary Asset Softens Price Competition
When the term (2α  - β ) < 0, price competition between the rival firms is quite different from that in
the previous case.  Now one firm’s ownership of the complementary asset softens price competition




O.  In other words, if firm 1 wins the bidding war in the first stage and acquires the
target firm, the profit of the rival firm 2 is now greater than the profit earned by either firm 1 or firm 2 if
neither firm purchases the complementary asset.  As in Case A, we define the benchmark profit shares s
O
and s










that we also have s
O  > s
L.  Similar to above we derive three propositions as follows.
Proposition B1: If C and therefore s are such that 0 ≤   s ≤  s
L, then there is a unique perfect Nash






L, where again, given our tie-
breaking rule, firm 1 wins the bidding war and firm 2 does not.










L, the same net profit that its rival, firm 2, earns.  Firm 2 does not have a profit
incentive to deviate from its bid of s
*
2 = s
L.  Offering a lower s2 will leave it in the same outcome11
and with the same net profit.  A higher bid of s2 > s
L will win the asset for firm 2, but only at the cost
of driving firm 2’s net profit below π
L.  Clearly such a deviation is not profitable.  Similarly, there is
no profitable deviation for firm 1.  A higher bid of s1 > s
L simply gives more profit to the initial
owners of the complementary asset leaving less for firm 1.  A lower bid such that s1 < s
L results in
firm 2 acquiring the desired asset instead of firm 1, which again does not raise firm 1’s profit.






L is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome when 0 ≤  s ≤  s
L is shown by
the following argument.  Consider first any pair of bids (s1, s2) where s ≤  s1 < s2 < s
L.  Clearly this cannot
be an equilibrium outcome because in this case firm 1 has an incentive to raise its bid above that of firm
2 and acquire the target firm.  As long as s1 < s
L, firm 1’s net profits will be increased by this deviation.
A similar argument holds for firm 2 where s  ≤   s2 <  s1 < s
L.  Now consider bidding pairs (s1, s2) where
either s1 < s2 < s, or where s2  ≤   s1 < s.  In either case, neither firm acquires the complementary asset.  As
a result, they both face tougher price competition and earn profit π
O.  In such a scenario at least one firm
has an incentive to increase its bid to s sufficient to acquire the target firm.  By so doing, such a firm
would earn net profit π
W(1-s) > π
O since s < s
O. QED.
Proposition B2: If C and therefore s are such that s
L < s  ≤  s







1 = s and s
*
2 < s, or s
*
1 < s and s
*
2 = s,  describes a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof:  The firm that pays s and obtains the complementary asset has no incentive to lower its offer.
Doing so will simply reduce its net profit to π
O.  Raising its bid will also reduce the firm’s net profit
by transferring more profit to the owners of the target firm.  Clearly, the rival firm that loses the
bidding cannot gain by lowering its offer. Nor can it do so by raising its offer above s. This will win
the complementary asset but only at the cost of pushing the firm’s profit below π
W(1-s). QED.
Similar to Case A, there is a third, remaining possibility to consider.  This is when C and hence s are
such that s >s
O.  The relevant proposition for this possibility is given below.
Proposition B3: If C and therefore s are such that s >s
O, then there are multiple perfect Nash






1 < s and s
*
2 < s, and in all of which neither12
firm acquires the complementary asset.
Proof:  Clearly, no firm can do better by lowering its offer.  Neither can any firm do better by
raising its offer.  Doing so only affects the market outcome when the raised offer is at least s.
However, since s > s
O, giving this share of gross profit to the shareholders of the target firm implies
that the firm acquiring that target will earn less net profit than it earns when neither firm makes such
an acquisition.  Hence, it cannot be in the interest of any firm to raise its bid unilaterally to s.  When
s > s
O, neither firm acquires the complementary asset.  No merger occurs. QED.
When ownership of the complementary asset in this industry softens price competition, i.e., when
(2α  - β ) < 0, the equilibrium outcome of particular interest is that described by Proposition B2.  What
makes this outcome so intriguing is its “winner’s curse” feature.  Although it is true that the two rival
firms are better off than either firm would be without acquiring the complementary asset, i.e., we have
that π
W(1-s) ≥  π
O and π
L > π
O, it is also true that for this case we have π
L > π
W (1-s) > π
O.  In other words,
the firm that “wins” the bidding war and acquires the unique complementary asset earns a net profit
π
W(1-s) that is actually less than the net profit π
L of its rival who “lost” the bidding contest.  The precise
dilemma facing each firm is this.  If neither makes a bid as high as s, both simply earn a profit of π
O.
This outcome cannot be an equilibrium because at least one firm would find it profitable to raise its offer
to meet the reservation price of the owners of the complementary asset, i.e., to the level of s.  However,
in so doing price competition is softened in the product market, and even though the winning firm earns
more profit, its acquisition of the complementary asset raises the profitability of its rival by even more.
5
Thus, once again we obtain the result that firms who are successful in winning bidding wars are not
more profitable than those that lose such contests, and in fact may often appear to be less profitable.  Yet
the comparison in this instance is somewhat misleading.  Yes, the winner is less profitable than the loser.
But when (2α  - β ) < 0, even the winner enjoys a profit increase as a result of the merger.  The truly
relevant comparison—but the one that cannot be empirically verified—is the comparison between the
winner’s post-merger profit and its profit had no merger ever occurred.13
IV.  Concluding Remarks
This paper has focused on two features of the corporate merger wave over the last several years.
One of these is that many mergers are either vertical or, more generally, involve the purchase of
complementary assets rather than the purchase of assets held by a direct competitor.  Furthermore, the
complementary assets bought by the acquiring firm are deployed to enhance the firm’s ability to compete
in its own market. The assets often have a brand name appeal or identity that can be used to differentiate
the acquiring firm’s product. The second feature of this merger wave has been that the lion’s share of any
gains generated by the merger to flow shareholders of the target firm rather than the acquiring one.
We have shown that the outcome of noncooperative bidding for firms owning complementary assets
depends critically as to how one firm’s ownership of such assets affects the price competition in the
differentiated product market in which the two bidders compete.  One possibility is that when one firm
acquires such assets, its rival is so disadvantaged in the eyes of consumers that it must cut price
aggressively, thereby, intensifying price competition.  The other possibility is that when one firm
purchases the complementary assets, the products of the two competing bidders become even more
differentiated with the result that price competition is weakened.
We have examined the bidding and product market outcomes for each of the two cases just
described.  In each case, when a merger occurs, the price paid by the winning bidder exceeds the
reproduction cost, or more generally the reservation selling price of the assets acquired.  This is
consistent with the common observation of significant stock price premia paid to the shareholders of
target firms.  We have also shown that in each of the two possible cases just described there is a rather
unfortunate “prisoner’s dilemma” type outcome for the bidding firms.  When price competition is
toughened by the ownership of the asset, the bidding for the complementary assets and the subsequent
price game results in both bidders earning less profit than they would have earned if no such assets
existed.  On the other hand when acquisition of the asset softens price competition, each of the bidding
firms does better than it would have done had the assets not existed but, paradoxically, the firm that wins
the bidding and that acquires the target firm may wind up with the lowest profit.14
Our results are consistent with much empirical merger evidence suggesting that stockholders of an
acquired firm do quite well, the stockholders of the acquiring firm barely break even.  Yet while
appealing this is perhaps not the most important message of the analysis.  Instead, what our findings
really indicate is that when firms interact strategically in both the product and the input markets, the
impact on profit can be particularly harsh.15
Endnotes
                                                          
*We thank George Norman and Pierluigi Balduzzi for helpful comments.
1 See J. Lippman and M. Peers, “In Clash of Media Titans, A Surprise From News Corp.”, The Wall
Street Journal, 14 August, 2000, p. B1.
2 See, e.g., “Merger Brief: First Among Equals”, The Economist, 26 August, 2000.
3 Most mergers involve financing, at least in part, with corporate stock.
4 Similarly, in Chen (2000), the strategic bidding game analyzed there depended upon the nature of the
relationship between the new product and the monopoly’s product, that is whether they were strategic
substitutes or complements.
5 It is possible to use a mixed strategy solution to answer the question which firm makes the winning bid.
Under such a scenario each firm bids the reservation share with some probability.  This solution concept
would not change the fundamental result that the firm acquiring complementary assets is worse off than
the firm that does not.16
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